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Global terrorism constitutes a veritable threat to international peace and security. On the other 
hand, Nigeria has witnessed sustained attacks through militancy and other forms of insurgency 
orchestrated by different groups since the inception of the 4th Republic in 1999. The operations of 
these armed groups with varying and conflictual ideological, political and ethno-religious agenda 
have become ominous to Nigeria’s quest of joining the league of the 20 largest economies in the 
world by 2020 as encapsulated in the Vision 20:2020 Economic Transformation Blueprint. This 
paper, therefore, examines the implication of militancy on the actualisation of the Vision 20:2020. 
Using the Radical Approach to National Security, the paper concludes that the answer to the 
national security question, sustainable economic development and the Vision 20:2020 is hinged on 
the welfare and security of the people. The paper recommends the formulation and effective 
implementation of populist policies and programmes capable of addressing the underlying causes 
of insurgency in Nigeria. These would invariably place Nigeria on the path of sustainable economic 
development thereby boosting its prospect of actualizing the Vision 20:2020. 
 






The unhealthy interface between insecurity and national development in Nigeria has been 
established in the literature (see Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013; Akpan et al, 2012; Nwagboso, 2012; 
Anyadike, 2013; Adebakin & Raimi, 2012). Nonetheless, substantial academic attention has not 
been paid to the overwhelming effect of militancy on the sustainability of growth of the national 
economy, especially in relation to Nigeria’s quest of being numbered amongst the 20 largest 
economies in the world by 2020 otherwise code-named Vision 20:2020. This paper is a contribution 
to the ongoing debate. The crux of the paper, therefore, is to analyze the implication of militancy in 
all its colourations since 1999 on the actualisation of the Vision 20:2020. 
It is noteworthy that the incidence of militancy in Nigeria predates the 4th Republic. 
Nonetheless, the dismantling of military rule in 1999 led to the proliferation of insurgent and 
rebellious groups that were hitherto suppressed by successive military governments. The activities 
of these nefarious groups have been ascendant since the enthronement of civilian rule in 1999. 
Successive civilian administrations have witnessed consistent and sustained pressure from different 
ethnic militias like the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Movement for the 
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Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger-Delta (MEND), Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), Arewa Youth Consultative Forum, etc. Similar 
pressure and general insecurity has also accompanied the increasing spate of kidnapping in the 
South-East geopolitical zone, politically motivated killings by unscrupulous groups, ethno-religious 
uprisings in Jos, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, as well as the incessant and often co-ordinated bombings 
in some terrorism-infested states of northern Nigeria by the Boko Haram sect. 
The Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 in Northern Nigeria marked a tipping point in the 
conflict between the sect and government authorities. The brazen execution-style killings by both 
sides left more than 800 people dead in Borno, Bauchi, Yobe and Kano States (Human Rights 
Watch, 2012:32). From 2009 till date, the sect has engaged in arson, bombing, shooting and 
stabbing with disdain and impunity. The insurgents have attacked some strategic and high profile 
places/persons like the Nigeria Police Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011; the UN House in 
Abuja on August 26, 2011; and St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla on December 25, 2011. 
Others are This Day and The Sun Newspapers’ Offices in Abuja and Kaduna on April 26, 2012; the 
massacre of nine construction workers at the Shehu of Borno Central Mosque, Maiduguri on July 1, 
2012; and the assassination of a respected elder statesman, Maj. Gen. Muhammadu Shuwa and his 
guest, Sagir Musa, on November 2, 2012 in Maiduguri. 
The activities of the Boko Haram insurgents and other militant sects in the country have 
caused Nigeria an irredeemable image crisis in the international community as well as engendered 
unprecedented humanitarian and economic catastrophe in the deeply affected states in Northern 
Nigeria. Accordingly, Adagba et al cited in Nwanegbo & Odigbo (2013: 289) assert that between 
July 27, 2009 and February 17, 2013, Boko Haram has launched fifty three (53) attacks in which 
1,157 people were killed and hundreds of people injured in Northern Nigeria. The threat posed by 
these insurgent and subversive groups to national security is real. Several rating agencies within 
the international community have repeatedly declared Nigeria a failing state. These are found in 
several circles as well as in policy papers. For instance, the Fund for Peace (FFP) in its 2012 report 
ranked Nigeria as one of the top 10 failed states in Africa and 14th in the world because of growing 
wave of insecurity and endemic violence (Tella cited in Adebakin & Raimi, 2012:3). 
The apparent inability of successive administrations to squarely and comprehensively address 
the lingering crisis of national security in Nigeria poses serious threats to the fragile unity and 
corporate existence of the country as a sovereign entity. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, 
the national security question adversely impinges on the sustainability of the Nigerian economy 
and, by implication, its preparedness to join the league of the 20 largest economies in the world by 
2020. The overall effect of the malaise is overwhelming. Within the period under study, it has 
dwindled income from petroleum resources because of pipeline vandalism and crude oil theft; 
resulted in astronomical increase in the nation’s expenditure on defence and internal security; 
weakened the infrastructural base of the economy; and decelerated the growth rate of the gross 
domestic product (GDP), etc. The different levels of government have also committed large chunk 
of their monthly allocations into rebuilding of public and private infrastructural facilities destroyed 
by the insurgents as well as the rehabilitation of victims of the attacks. 
Furthermore, the crisis of national security has culminated in unprecedented diversion of 
scarce capital in the national budget for the procurement of sophisticated military hardware. This 
has correspondingly denied capital projects in the education, health, agriculture and construction 
sectors the needed attention. According to the 2012 Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria, in the 
2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 fiscal years, the total expenditure earmarked for both internal security 
and defence in the approved budgets were ө292.7 billion, ө276.5 billion, ө422.9 billion and ө563.2 
billion respectively (CBN 2012, see Table II below). Despite huge spending on defence and internal 
security in Nigeria, wave of insecurity of lives and property continues unabated in different regions 
of the country. The vandalism of oil installations, theft of crude oil, and hostage-taking of 
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expatriate workers in the Niger Delta; the unabated incidence of kidnapping in the South East; the 
unmitigated armed robbery in the South West; and ethno-religious crises and the Boko Haram 
insurgence in different parts of the northern region have enervated economic sustainability and the 
Vision 20:2020 agenda in Nigeria. See Table I below for a highlight of the regional distribution of 
insurgent operations of these sectarian groups in Nigeria since 1999. The table also shows the 
dimension and degree of intensity of the sectarian unrests. 
Although Nigeria is unarguably one of the countries with enormous untapped market for 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa, it has continually witnessed poor participation of foreign 
investors in economic development of the country. The economy continues to wobble under the 
weight of militancy and insurgency. This has damaged investors’ confidence thereby sending the 
economy on a downward slide. The 2011 world investment report prepared by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Investment (UNCTAD) confirms the decline in FDI. According to the 
report, FDI capital to Nigeria declined to $6.1 billion in 2010 from $8.28 billion in 2009 (UNCTAD, 
2011). Similarly, Umejei (2011) notes that: 
most of the foreign missions have advised their citizenry to be wary of doing business in the 
country because of what they believe is a high security risk...hence, with travel advisories by most 
of the foreign missions warning their citizenry of the risk of doing business in Nigeria, it remains to 
be seen how the government can muster $33 billion as projected. 
 Corroborating the foregoing, Gbanite quoted in Nwagboso (2012: 245) opines that: 
...when our citizens’ right to safety from all kinds of man-made threats are reduced 
considerably, the government will inherit an increase in foreign investments...most countries would 
like a likely trading partner to secure the lives and property of their citizens first before they 
themselves allow theirs to move into such territories... 
The effects of the various threats to national security on the sustainability of economic 
development in Nigeria as well as its overall implication for the Vision 20:2020 agenda are quite 
phenomenal. Arising from the foregoing therefore, it is appropriate to investigate, analyze and 
answer the question: does the recurrence of militancy in Nigeria since 1999 implicate the 
actualization of the Vision 20:2020? The paper reveals that the realization or otherwise of the 
Vision 20:2020 is, among other things, hinged on the ability of the federal government to 
comprehensively address the security questions in the country. The paper is divided into five 
sections namely: introduction, theoretical framework, the crisis of national security and sustainable 
economic development in Nigeria, the implication of the crisis of national security on the Vision 
20:2020 and conclusion and recommendations. 
 
Table I: Regional Distribution of Security Crisis in Nigeria since 1999 
S/N Security Threat Geo-Political Zone Degree of Intensity 
1 Niger-Delta Militancy South-South Recessive 
2 Ethno-Religious Crisis Northern Region Dominant 
3 Kidnapping, Ritual Killings, & Armed Robbery South-East Dominant 
4 Boko Haram Insurrection Northern Region Dominant 
5 State Terrorism (Bakassi Boys, OPC, Arewa Youth  Consultative Forum, etc) 
Evenly spread across the 
country Recessive 
Source: Authors’ Fieldwork 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
The unhealthy interaction between the crisis of national security, sustainable economic 
development and the Vision 20:2020 in Nigeria cannot be appreciated without adequate 
understanding of national security. A close examination of the origin and escalation of the activities 
of militants and other insurgent groups since the return to civil rule in 1999 shows that the state 
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and its apparatuses are intricately involved and even culpable. This is essentially because of the 
prevailing warped conceptualization of national security. Consequently, this paper employs the 
radical approach to national security as its theoretical framework. 
The radical approach to the conceptualization of national security arose as a counterpoise to 
the overwhelming influence and dominance of the orthodox, militaristic and state-centric 
interpretation and understanding of national security. This scholarship which has dominated the 
international system evolved from the Westphalia state system after 1648. Thus, the orthodox 
scholarship conceptualizes national security purely as politico-military phenomenon. It is used to 
refer to the capacity of a ruling group to use state power to protect its interest or values from 
external threats as well as maintain order internally. This unbridled use of instruments of coercion 
otherwise called ‘hard security’ to maintain an existing state of affairs, usually favourable to the 
ruling groups is largely implicated in the origin and escalation of militancy and terrorism in Nigeria. 
Accordingly, Mbah (2008:156) argues that the greater application of hard security is an indication 
that the ruling groups are in fact insecure, notwithstanding the appearance of strength represented 
by coercive instruments of the state. 
Contrariwise, the radical approach to national security as championed by the neo-Marxist 
scholars like Okwudiba Nnoli, Esko Toyo, Assisi Asobie, Claude Ake, Okechukwu Ibeanu, Ogban 
Ogban-Iyam, amongst others relates national security to the satisfaction of basic human needs. 
These needs include the provision of social services (food, shelter, education, health), the right to a 
sustainable environment, the protection of cultural and religious identity, and so on. The 
absence/neglect of these essential services is largely responsible for the ever increasing spate of 
armed violence and terrorism in the country since 1999. 
The Nigerian state through its coercive apparatuses has inflicted and imposed extreme 
suffering on the citizenry. This is done essentially in the name of ‘national security’. According to 
Nnoli (2006), this has been possible because much of the leadership in Africa and the rest of the 
world have rigidly adhered to the concept of national security devised during the seventeenth 
century in accordance with realities of the time. The prevailing conception of national security in 
terms of external attack is therefore, largely defective and irrelevant. There is general acceptance 
that national security must go beyond the narrow focus on external attack and the use of the 
military to defeat it. Thus, Nnoli (2006:17) avers that: 
although a concern for security must ultimately focus on the physical danger to a state that is 
posed by imbalances in military power, a concern for security cannot be limited simply to military 
power. A state fashions the military power it deploys from various elements: the economic wealth 
of the nation, the quality of its political leadership, the cohesiveness of the polity, the motivation of 
its citizenry, the nature of its military leadership, its access to food and raw materials, and so on. 
Ultimately, security demands military power sufficient to dissuade or defeat an attack; but so 
many non-military elements are required to generate effective military power that a concern for 
security can never be restricted solely to the final military end product. It is therefore not surprising 
that the orthodox conceptualization of national security is counterpoised to human, environmental, 
economic and social security. In the resultant anarchy of perspective that prevails, individuals, 
rebel movements, ethnic groups, political parties and even pressure groups implement disparate 
security measures. Consequently, private security outfits, ethnic militias, political thugs and armed 
rebel movements emerge. 
The disintegration of the security arrangements of the Nigerian state has produced serious 
discussions about the concept of national security and its underlying relations to power. It has 
demonstrated the failure of the successive Nigerian governments to link the security of their 
regimes to the physical security of their citizens. The government is yet to realize that the best 
guarantee of state security is the security of their citizens, and the willing acceptance by the latter 
of the political rules of the game on which the legitimacy of the state rests. The radical approach to 
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security is therefore more inclined to see citizens, rather than states as the beneficiaries of national 
security. 
Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the lives and properties of ordinary Nigerians have 
been terrorized by different armed groups. These groups which range from ethnic militias to state-
sponsored terrorists include MOSOP, MASSOB, Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, OPC, MEND, Arewa 
Consultative Forum, ethno-religious fanatics in Jos, Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi and the Boko Haram 
sect. The origin and escalation of the activities of these groups are not dissociated from the 
government’s penchant to exclude, marginalize and discriminate against the generality of the 
citizenry or some parts of it. Accordingly, Nnoli (2006:9) holds that: 
political exclusion, economic marginalization, and social discrimination threaten the security of 
citizens to such an extent that they regard the state as the primary threat to their survival. In 
desperation, the victimized citizens take the laws into their own hands as a means of safeguarding 
their fundamental values from the threat of unacceptable government policies. People who believe 
that the government no longer represents their best interests seek, by all means, to overthrow it or 
otherwise establish an alternative state. The decline of the state as the guarantor of protection and 
human security is serious; but its role as the creator of insecurity is more serious. 
In internal security management in Nigeria, the roles of the Nigerian Police Force, the Prisons 
Services, the Nigerian Immigration Services, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, the 
Nigerian Customs Service and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency are obviously 
indispensable. Unfortunately, the management of internal security in Nigeria seems to have been 
an exercise in futility in spite of the establishment of numerous security apparatuses as well as 
huge budgetary allocation to security agencies. Following this analytical tradition, a number of 
observers like Usman (2010), Asuni (2007), Aghedo & Oarhe (2009), have persuasively argued that 
Nigeria's security management is bedevilled with misdiagnosis and very poor institution building. 
Paradoxically, the Nigeria's security establishments with the responsibility of dousing the internal 
security challenges in the country is spectacularly obsessed with 'hard' factors – those factors that 
threaten the very foundation of the state and by extension, the vested interests of the ruling elite. 
This pathetic scenario has been at the expense of the 'soft' factors – factors that affect the entire 
society. In a similar context, the current conception of the Nigeria's internal security management 
is at best state-centred and not society-centred. 
As noted above, the unprecedented diversion of scarce capital in the national budget for the 
procurement of hi-tech equipment has correspondingly denied capital projects in the education, 
health, agriculture and construction sectors the needed attention (see Table II below). Despite 
huge spending on defence and internal security in Nigeria, wave of insecurity of lives and property 
continues unabated in different regions of the country. The vandalism of oil pipelines, crude oil 
theft, and hostage-taking of expatriate workers in the Niger Delta; the interminable incidence of 
kidnapping in the South East; the ferocious armed robbery in the South West; and ethno-religious 
crises and the Boko Haram insurrection in different parts of the northern region have become 
ominous to economic sustainability and the Vision 20:2020 agenda in Nigeria. 
While the 36 states and the 774 local government councils in Nigeria enjoy security votes, the 
enormous fund allocated to this vote has not translated into better and more secure environment 
that is supportive of sustainable economic development and the Vision 20:2020. Consequently, the 
votes have come under serious attacks and criticisms in recent times. The prevailing public opinion 
is in total support of its abrogation on the ground that it is not economically sustainable considering 
the diverse challenges facing the nation. Greater emphasis must therefore be paid to the human 
components of our national security otherwise called ‘soft security’. This involves the conscious 
formulation and effective implementation of policies and programmes that could accelerate the 
amelioration of poverty, exploitation, diseases, injustice, and the like. This will provide the fertile 
ground for the revitalization of our wobbling national economy and consequently, facilitate the 
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accomplishment of the Vision 20:2020. 
 
3. The Interface between National Security and Sustainable Economic Development in 
Nigeria 
 
There is no single universally accepted definition of national security. The variety of definitions 
provides an overview of the many implications of the concept. The term remains ambiguous, 
having originated from simpler definitions which initially emphasized the freedom from military 
threat and political coercion. However, the scope of the term has been expanded to include other 
forms of non-military security as suits the circumstances of the time. The term has therefore been 
enlarged to include elements such as economic and environmental security. According to Harold 
Brown, the former US Secretary of Defence, national security is the ability to preserve a nation's 
physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on 
reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; 
and to control its borders (Brown cited in Watson, 2008:281). Similarly, Prabhakaran (2008:521) 
defines national security as: 
The measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-dimensional threats 
to the apparent well-being of its people and its survival as a nation-state at any given time, by 
balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, that can be indexed by computation, 
empirically or otherwise, and is extendable to global security by variables external to it. 
National security is therefore an appropriate and aggressive blend of political resilience, 
human resources, economic structure and capacity, technological competence, industrial base, 
availability of natural resources and of course the military might. National security from the various 
definitions provided above is a sacrosanct and non-negotiable phenomenon in human society. Little 
wonder Section 14(b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states that the 
security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government. 
On the other hand, the term sustainable economic development or sustainable development is 
a novel concept in the development literature. Sustainable economic development is defined as an 
economic development which meets the needs of present generation without endangering or 
compromising the needs of future generation. The World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED), one of the foremost international bodies advocating economic and 
environmental sustainability across the globe, defines sustainable development as development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs (WCED, 2000:43). Similarly, Tounés et al (2011) view sustainable economic 
development as a worthy attempt by environmentalists, economists and scientists to come up with 
new models of exploiting the environment and its resources in a manner that guarantee long-term 
economic, social and environmental progress. 
Sustainable development is a process in which the natural resource base (of a nation) is not 
allowed to deteriorate but utilised optimally for the benefits of the current and future citizens. The 
term aims at ensuring the effective utilisation of physical environment and its diverse natural 
resources in a manner that the environment and its resources would provide continuous stream of 
benefits to both current and future generation. It became a front-burner issue because of rising 
ecological challenges in the forms of impact of residue of agricultural pesticide on lives, effect of 
growing population demographics, emergence of environmental protection protests across Europe 
and America and the backlash of the Earth Day summit. 
National security is generally held as a prerequisite for economic growth by economic 
development theorists. In other words, the sustainability or otherwise of the development of any 
given economy is essentially dependent on the general state of health of the national security 
architecture. The prevailing unenviable state of the Nigerian economy is attributable to the poverty 
of understanding of the ramifications of national security in the country. This has culminated in the 
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adoption of a reductionist approach through which national security is associated with or 
approximated to the acquisition of sophisticated hi-tech military equipment. Thus, the proportion of 
GDP devoted to military spending or purchasing of arms has increased exponentially over the last 
decade. This diverts funds from productive activities to unproductive ones. Other things being 
equal, a rise in military spending exerts a negative impact on the rate of investment in productive 
fixed capital. This occurs because of well- known crowding-out effects: an increase in military 
spending must be financed either by raising current taxes or by borrowing (future taxes). In either 
case, it will lower the expected after-tax return on productive fixed capital, while simultaneously 
reducing the flow of (domestic plus foreign) savings that is available to finance productive fixed 
capital formation in the domestic economy (Deger & Smith, 1983:335). 
The 2012 Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria indicates that in the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 
2011 fiscal years, the total expenditure earmarked for both internal security and defence in the 
approved budgets were ө164.5 billion, ө276.5 billion, ө422.9 billion and ө563.2 billion respectively 
(CBN, 2012). Official statistics provided by the apex bank from 2000 to 2011 lend credence to the 
fact that national spending on security is not economically sustainable (see Table II below). For 
instance, defence and internal security spending for 2000 were approximately N43.4 billion and 
N25.2billion respectively. Considering the deplorable security situation in the country, the 
budgetary provision has risen astronomically. From table II below, the budgeted amount for 
security in 2006 was N202.2 billion. By 2010, the nation was spending the sum of N422.9billion on 
security. Right from 2000 to 2011, the huge budgetary allocation to defence and internal security 
has diverted attention from education, agriculture, health and construction. In 2006, allocations to 
education, agriculture, health and construction were N87.3billion, N17.2, N62.3billion and 
N20.1billion respectively. The analysis shows clearly the preference for security as opposed to 
boosting real sectors of the economy that impact directly on the wellbeing of Nigerians. 
 
Table II: Federal Government Recurrent Expenditure (N’ Million) 
Year *Security Education Agriculture Health Construction GDP 
1961 9.47 4.52 0.42 1.81 0.59 2361.2 
1965 27.73 10.61 6.08 1.88 25.29 3110.0 
1970 135.18 24.44 1.92 12.48 14.28 5205.1 
1975 610.11 126.5 22.48 52.85 31.97 20957 
1980 595.13 155.81 17.14 52.79 46.03 49632.3 
1985 1430.2 258.60 20.36 132.02 151.11 70633.2 
1990 6540.2 2402.80 258.00 500.70 643.40 271908 
1995 11855.2 9746.40 1510.40 3320.70 1699.10 1934831 
2000 68556.99 57956.64 6335.80 15218.08 4991.09 4727523 
2001 85922.29 39882.60 7064.55 24522.27 7202.04 5374335 
2002 132369.9 80530.88 9993.55 40621.42 7452.14 6232244 
2003 119444 64782.15 7537.35 33267.98 16951.37 6061700 
2004 174117.5 76524.65 11256.15 34197.14 14897.01 11411067 
2005 153618.1 82795.06 16325.60 55661.63 17914.96 15610882 
2006 202200 87294.56 17212.81 62300.00 20100.00 18564595 
2007 253400 107529.39 21202.73 81900.00 71300.00 20657.317 
2008 164500 164000.0 65400.0 98200.00 94500.00 24296329 
2009 276490 137156.6 22435.2 90200.00 80630.00 24794238 
2010 422900 170800.00 25200.00 99100.00 138050.00 29205782 
2011 563200 335800.00 41200.00 231800.00 195900.00 33994612 
*Security column is the summation of expenditures for Defence and Internal Security for 1961-2011 
Sources: Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazettes, Central Bank of Nigeria (1961, 1965, 1970, 
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000í2011) 
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Apart from diverting attention from the productive sectors of the national economy, the growing 
crisis of national security in Nigeria has adversely affected the country's economy. Before the 
federal government's Amnesty Programme designed for repentant militants in the Niger Delta 
region, the oil production and the number of barrels produced per day declined drastically. This 
was largely due to kidnapping and hostage of oil workers in the region. This singular problem 
adversely reduced government's revenue from oil as well as implementation of government's 
policies and programmes during this period. Thus, most capital projects captured in the 2007 and 
2008 annual budgets were not effectively implemented largely due to shortage of financial 
resources occasioned by militancy in the Niger Delta. This include the construction and 
rehabilitation of federal roads in the six geo-political zones, construction of dams in the North-West 
and North-Central zones, the immediate take-off of dredging of River Niger, and construction of 
additional power plants in the six geo-political zones (Ezeobi, 2009:47). This ugly trend denied 
Nigerians these amenities because government was incapacitated to provide social services to the 
people. 
Similarly, the spate of kidnapping in some parts of Nigeria ultimately resulted in serious 
economic problems. The continuous kidnap cases in commercial cities of Port Harcourt, Aba and 
Onitsha, obviously forced investors, businessmen and manufacturing companies to either relocate 
to other relatively peaceful cities in Nigeria or other countries within the West African sub-region. 
In Aba for instance, the NBL, SEVEN UP PLC, UNILEVA PLC, PZ PLC relocated to Enugu largely due 
to constant kidnapping of their expatriates (Nwagboso, 2012:254). The period 2007-2011 
witnessed increase in kidnapping activities and the target group initially was the businessmen who 
frequently paid millions of naira as ransoms to kidnappers. Later on, this inhuman and violent 
criminal activity was extended to poor people and innocent children in the affected states in 
Nigeria. More worrisome is the silent suspicion that the security agencies are actually involved in 
the business of kidnap for ransom in the South. 
Although the security challenges seemed not to have completely deterred investments inflow 
into the country, it has indisputably become the gravest bane to national development in Nigeria. 
According to Agomuo (2013:1), in the first nine months of 2012, data from the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) shows that portfolio investment stood at US$4.6 billion while Foreign Direct 
Investment stood at $1.44 billion. Foreign investors also controlled an average of 60 percent of all 
trading done on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 2012 despite rising insecurity. However, what is 
difficult to evaluate is how much investments would have come into the country without the 
current security challenges. This is the opportunity cost of the current insecurity which (because it 
is difficult to measure), has been ignored by political economists and the government. The ever-
increasing cases of kidnapping in the country has therefore affected Nigeria’s quest to sustain the 
growth of the national economy through the attraction of foreign direct investors. The malaise has 
considerably eroded investors’ confidence thereby diminishing the per capita output and technology 
transfer into the country. 
In a typical behaviour of a nation that thrives on a rent economy, the government has always 
sought to buy peace and always ended with the peace of the graveyard like the current situation in 
the Niger Delta region. The ineffectively implemented and corruption-riddled Amnesty Programme 
has transformed the erstwhile militants into either top level government contractors or emergency 
crude oil refiners in the creeks or kidnap merchants. Thus, it is the opinion of this paper that the 
programme which has gulped several billions of naira from government’s revenue cannot sustain 
the relative peace in the region. 
Besides the incidences of kidnapping and militancy in the Niger Delta region, the lingering 
Boko Haram insurgence which started in 2009 in Maiduguri, Borno State has brought the economy 
of the northern region to a standstill. The insurgence has weakened the north’s once prosperous 
textile industry, thereby leaving thousands of people unemployed. Similarly, major consumer 
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goods’ companies have seen their distribution chains destabilised as the distributors of their goods 
in the northern part of the country have been forced to relocate to the south. The 
telecommunication companies have seen their facilities destroyed while bank branches have been 
attacked and robbed. Several road construction companies have seen their expatriate staff 
kidnapped and in some cases killed. The economic cost of the violence may however be difficult to 
evaluate immediately in terms of lost investment opportunities and actual cost of damage done to 
existing infrastructure and human lives. Under the prevailing security situation, the first group of 
individuals to flee the country are investors or potential investors; those whose capital would have 
made any GDP growth possible at all. 
Furthermore, the agricultural sector which provides jobs for most people and contributes 
almost 40% of our GDP has been devastated by the Boko Haram insurgence in the northern 
region. The 24 hours curfew imposed on Kaduna and Yobe States in June 2012 following the 
escalation of the insurgence provide vivid examples of what is in store for Nigerian agriculture. 
Kano, Kaduna and Yobe States are pivotal to the success of Nigerian agriculture which is over 75% 
northern based. Apart from being major contributors, Kano and Kaduna are vital trans-shipment 
points for produce from the Northwest while Yobe performs the same role for transport of 
agricultural produce from the Northeast. Even without 24 hour curfew, there has been a sharp drop 
in the flow of agricultural output, with post-harvest losses previously estimated at 40% soaring to 
more than 50% (Sobowale, 2012:2). 
Owing to the fact that most farm produce are raw materials, any delay between farm gate 
and markets increases the post-harvest loss incrementally with the days spent on the road. With 
curfew, most of what is loaded at the farm will have to be thrown away. This was the situation in 
the 1990s when Kano State was rocked by a series of violent demonstrations. The entire length of 
the Kano-Zaria Expressway was littered with rotten tomatoes, peppers and vegetables. Thus, the 
Boko Haram insurrection which has wider regional spread with its attendant catastrophe portends 
greater ill to the Nigerian economy. 
This prevailing state of insecurity has lowered agricultural outputs as farmers flee to safer 
territories. Second, those who still brave the odds to go farming (mainly because they have no 
other means of livelihood and no place to go), might find it difficult to evacuate their farm produce 
now that transporters are reluctant to go to the northern region. Narrating his ordeal in his bid to 
secure the services of transporters from Lagos (Iddo and Apapa) to Maiduguri, Sobowale (2012:2) 
laments that: 
only one out of 35 was willing to go; and that was because the company’s headquarters is in 
Maiduguri. Even, that “willing” driver set conditions that would have been considered insane only 
two years ago. Apart from charging three times the normal rate for the trip, he could not guarantee 
reaching Maiduguri in less than two weeks...and at the sign of great trouble, he would abandon the 
consignment and run for dear life. 
The ripple effects of the foregoing are enormous. Despite our over-dependence on imported 
raw materials as a nation, there are some agro-allied manufacturing businesses which depend on 
local agricultural input for production. For instance, NESTLE and Cadbury, the world’s largest food 
marketers purchase millions of tonnes of onions, soybean and sorghum from local farmers. 
Similarly, the United African Company of Nigeria (UACN) Feed Processor Grand located in Jos, is 
perhaps the country’s largest consumer of groundnut and soybean; so does Livestock Feeds. These 
are only a few of the manufacturers whose fortunes and ours are inextricably tied with the fate of 
farmlands in the northern region. The bigger tragedy lies in the fact that famine and hunger which 
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4. The Implication of the Crisis of National Security on Vision 20:2020 
 
The Vision 20:2020 is a dream statement that Nigeria would become one of the first 20 economies 
in the world by the year 2020. According to the Nigeria Vision 20:2020 Economic Transformation 
Blueprint, by 2020 Nigeria will be one of the 20 largest economies in the world, able to consolidate 
its leadership role in Africa and establish itself as significant player in the global economic and 
political arena (NV20:2020, 2009). The Vision is essentially aimed at achieving a globally 
competitive economy that is resilient, diversified and able to fully optimize Nigerian human and 
natural resources to meet the needs and aspirations of her citizens. It also tends to achieve an 
industrialized economy with a globally competitive manufacturing sector that is tightly integrated 
with the primary resource base of the nation and contributes about 25% to the GDP. Thus, 
according to the NV20:2020 (2009:9), the Vision statement posits that:    
Nigeria will have a large, strong, diversified, competitive, technologically enabled economy 
that effectively harnesses the talents and energy of its people and responsibly exploits its national 
endowments to guarantee a high standard of living and quality of life to its citizens. 
The federal government through the National Planning Commission launched the Nigerian 
Vision 20:2020 in December 2010. The Vision is traceable to a research conducted in 2005 by 
Goldman Sachs, a New York-based investment banking group. The research suggested that if 
current reforms are sustained, Nigeria would emerge the strongest economy in Africa, superseding 
South Africa and Egypt. It held that by 2020 Nigeria would become one of the 25 biggest world 
economies and by 2025 the 20th largest economy in the world. The report indicates that the 
country may even grow by 2050 to become the 12th largest economy in the world ahead of 
countries like Italy, Canada and Korea. In the same vein, Nigeria has been ranked amongst the N-
11 countriesȸ countries identified by Goldman Sachs to have the potential for attaining global 
competitiveness based on their economic and demographic settings and the foundation for reforms 
already laid. Nonetheless, the reports noted the challenge the nation faces in converting 
potentiality into reality. These reports apparently encouraged the government to pursue the vision 
of placing Nigeria among the 20 largest economies in the world by 2020. According to Eneh 
(2011:21), this was based on assessment of its abundant human and material resources and on 
the assumption that the country’s resources would be properly managed and channelled to set 
economic goals. 
The vision is an articulation of the long-term intent to launch Nigeria onto a path of sustained 
social and economic progress and accelerate the emergence of a truly prosperous and united 
Nigeria. In recognition of the enormous human and natural endowments of the nation, the long 
term plan is to improve the living standards of Nigerians and place the country among the league 
of 20 largest economies in the world with a minimum GDP of $900 billion and a per capita income 
of not less than $4000 per annum.  The targets for year 2020 are based on a dynamic comparative 
analysis of the country’s potential growth rate and economic structure vis-à-vis those of other top 
40 economies in the world (Ayodele et al, 2013; NV20:2020, 2009). The implication of this 
projection is that the Nigerian economy must grow at an average of 13.8% per annum during the 
time horizon. Agricultural and industrial sectors are expected to drive the growth at the earlier 
stage while service sector will take over from 2018. In other words, the economy would transform 
from agro-allied industrialization to service-based economy in line with the theory of economic 
development.  
In his analysis of the Vision 20:2020 Economic Transformation Blueprint, Akpan (2009:35) 
states that the Vision 20:2020 has seven objectives, namely: 
 To make Nigeria one of the 20 largest economies in the world by the year 2020; 
 To make Nigeria an international finance centre; 
 To evaluate Nigeria’s potentials using development variables; 
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 To make Nigeria to be African’s financial hub where most of the international financial 
transactions in Africa would be connected with Nigeria; 
 To help other African nations move out of financial doldrums; 
 To move Nigeria out of third world country state to an industrialized nation; 
 To drive rapid and sustainable economic growth in Nigeria and Africa. 
To be one of the 20 biggest economies by 2020 means that Nigeria must be able to do what 
some of the 20 biggest economies like the USA, China,  Japan, Germany, France, Brazil, United 
Kingdom, Italy, India, Russia, Canada, Australia, Spain, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, 
Netherlands, Turkey, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, can do. As noted above, the vision envisages a 
GDP size of US$900 billion. However, the current size of Nigeria’s GDP is US$245,229 billion, 
US$268,708 billion, US$262,606 billion and US$268,700 billion and global ranking by size of GDP is 
39, 37, 37 and 37 out of 193 countries based on the United Nations, World Bank, IMF and CIA 
World Factbook 2012 data respectively (see Table III below). While the projected growth rate per 
annum over the time horizon is 13.8%, the growth rates for the economy since 2009 are as 
follows: 2009 (7%); 2010 (8.1%); 2011 (6.9%); 2012 (6.7%) (See 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/). The growth levels above are well below the 
desired growth of 13.8% per annum. It is very easy to see the yawning gap between the GDP of 
$900 billion required by 2020 and the present situation. Thus, each year the country fails to grow 
at the projected 13.8%, it places itself in a situation in which it has to grow by 17 to 19% in 
subsequent years in order to catch up. Even a non-economist knows that this is impossible! 
 
Table III: List of the First 20 Largest Economies in the World by GD 
 
Rank Country *GDP $Billion (UN, 2012) Country 
**GDP $Billion















2 China 7,203,784 China 8,227,034 China 8,227,103 China 8,227,000 
3 Japan 5,870,357 Japan 5,963,969 Japan 5,959,718 Japan 5,964,000 
4 Germany 3,604,061 Germany 3,400,579 Germany 3,399,589 Germany 3,401,000 
5 France 2,775,518 France 2,608,699 France 2,612,878 France 2,609,000 





7 United Kingdom 2,429,184 Brazil 2,395,968 Brazil 2,252,664 Brazil 2,396,000 
8 Italy 2,195,937 Russia 2,021,960 Russia 2,014,775 Russia 2,058,000 
9 India 1,897,608 Italy 2,014,079 Italy 2,013,263 Italy 2,014,000 
10 Russia 1,857,770 India 1,824,832 India 1,841,717 India 1,825,000 
11 Canada 1,736,869 Canada 1,819,081 Canada 1,821,424 Canada 1,819,000 
12 Australia 1,515,468 Australia 1,541,797 Australia 1,520,608 Australia 1,542,000 
13 Spain 1,478,206 Spain 1,352,057 Spain 1,349,351 Spain 1,352,000 
14 Mexico 1,155,206 Mexico 1,177,116 Mexico 1,177,271 Mexico 1,177,000 
15 South Korea 1,116,247 South Korea 1,155,872 South Korea 1,129,598 South Korea 1,156,000 
16 Indonesia 846,834 Indonesia 878,198 Indonesia 878,043 Indonesia 894,900 
17 Netherlands 836,823 Turkey 794,468 Turkey 789,257 Turkey 794,500 
18 Turkey 774,983 Netherlands 773,116 Netherlands 772,227 Netherlands 773,100 
19 Switzerland 660,762 Saudi Arabia 723,307 Switzerland 632,194 Saudi Arabia 727,300 
20 Saudi Arabia 597,086 Switzerland 632,400 Saudi Arabia 576,824 Switzerland 632,400 
 28    S/Africa        408,237     29 S/Africa    384,315      29 S/Africa        384,313        29 S/Africa         384,300 
39     Nigeria         245,229      37 Nigeria      268,708      37 Nigeria         262,606        37 Nigeria           268,700 
Key: 
*The first table includes data for the year 2012 for the first 20 largest economies of the world within the United Nations. 
Data are in billions of international dollars and were calculated by the United Nations. 
**The second table includes data for the year 2012 for the first 20 largest economies of the world within the IMF. Data 
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are in billions of international dollars and were calculated by the IMF. 
***The third table includes data for the year 2012 for the current United Nations member states. Data are in billions of 
international dollars and were compiled by the World Bank. 
****The fourth table is a tabulation of the CIA World Factbook GDP data update of 2012. Final figures are estimates in 




Meanwhile, clarifying doubts on the prospects of actualizing the Vision 20:2020 while presenting 
the 2012 achievements of his ministry before the leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 
on 24th April 2012, the then Minister of National Planning, Dr Shamsuddeen Usman noted inter 
alia: 
where were we in 2009 when we started the process?  We were number 44. By the end of 
2011, we were number 39 and by the end of 2012 we were number 36. This is progress…What I 
am saying is that even if we are not number 20 by that time, if by 2020 we are number 25, I will 
be a proud man. The reason is that we are consciously moving and doing all the necessary things 
to move up there (Vanguard, April 30, 2013). 
Reiterating the above claims by the then minister, Eze (2013) notes that: 
...the Commission and the Minister have continued to repose hope in the Vision as a realistic 
long term growth and development roadmap for the country, in line with this Administration’s 
demonstrated determination, disposition and capacity to do things differently, to bring about 
change and the needed economic growth and strategic development. 
A critical look at the national economy under the prevailing state of insecurity indicates that 
these positive and optimistic prospects from the Ministry of National Planning pale into 
insignificance. Accordingly, the vision is widely discountenanced as a utopian stunt that is not 
based on sound economics. This is essentially, though not exclusively, because of the prevailing 
state of insecurity in the country. Although Nigeria has made remarkable progress in some key 
sectors of the economy such as the macro-economic environment, information communication 
technology and science, the country’s economic standing on the global scene in 2020 does not put 
her among the 20 most economically developed countries in the world as contained in the 
NV20:2020 document. Wave of insecurity of lives and property continues unabated in different 
parts of the country. The vandalism of oil pipelines, crude oil theft, and hostage-taking of 
expatriate workers in the Niger Delta, the interminable incidence of kidnapping in the South East, 
the armed robbery in the South West, and ethno-religious crises and the Boko Haram insurrection 
in different parts of the northern region have become ominous to the Vision 20:2020 project. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The paper examined the implication of the recurrent incidents of militancy and terrorism in Nigeria 
since 1999 on the actualization of the Vision 20:2020. It reveals that the realization of the Vision 
20:2020 is essentially, though not exclusively, hinged on the ability of the Federal Government to 
squarely and comprehensively address the security questions in the country. Anchoring analysis 
within the radical approach to national security, the paper found that the undue attention paid to 
the hard (instead of the soft) components of our national security by the successive administrations 
is largely responsible for the origination and escalation of the activities of different militant and 
terrorist groups in Nigeria since 1999. As a misguided solution to the multifarious crises of national 
security, the government has consistently increased the annual fiscal allocation to internal security 
and defence within the period under study. However, the present practice whereby security gulps 
larger proportion of the national budget is unhealthy and unsustainable. This is because it has 
continued to deny critical sectors like health, education, agriculture, energy, construction, etc. the 
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needed attention and funding. 
The vast human and material potentials in the country have not been repositioned to build a 
fast growing, dynamic and prosperous economy. Several factors such as harsh business 
environment have undermined the country’s development. Its huge potentials are largely 
untapped, local entrepreneurship is weak while inflow of FDI remains unimpressive. This is because 
the degree of public safety and security is not only a barometer of political stability but also a key 
consideration by potential investors. Nigeria therefore needs as much foreign and domestic 
investment as it can garner to realize the ambition of the vision especially under the prevailing 
international perception of the country as riven by periodic eruptions of violence. The underlying 
causes of these problems need to be effectively addressed to create an enabling environment for 
the country’s sustained growth and long term development. The paper therefore established that 
this ugly trend has crippled the national economy and correspondingly dimmed the actualization of 
the Vision 20:2020 project, which is merely seven years away.  
Arising from the above findings therefore, the following recommendations are proffered: 
 The federal government in collaboration with other sub-national governments should work 
assiduously to provide direct and indirect employment opportunities for the army of 
unemployed, disillusioned and restive youth in the country who are readily available for 
recruitment as militants, armed robbers, kidnappers, abductors and terrorists. The federal 
government should therefore formulate and effectively implement policies and 
programmes capable of addressing the root causes of insecurity in Nigeria such as 
poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, dearth of infrastructural facilities, 
uneven development, among others. 
 The federal government should phase out the National Poverty Eradication Programme 
(NAPEP) and establish a more viable and result-oriented agency capable of addressing the 
problem of abject poverty among large population of Nigerians, particularly those residing 
in the rural areas. 
 The government should resuscitate the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) and 
reposition agricultural sector so as to play active role in job creation for Nigerian youths. 
 Since national security is the precondition which enhances the ability of government, its 
agencies, and citizens to function without let or hindrance, the successful implementation 
or otherwise of NV20:2020 is largely dependent on the state of security in the country. All 
inclusive and well coordinated security networks should therefore be worked out as a 
matter of urgency to assure safety of life and properties in Nigeria. 
 As a corollary, the federal government should re-organize the country’s intelligence system 
and build a capable and more proactive security apparatus in Nigeria. This will add more 
values in checking incessant bombings, robbery, kidnapping and violent crimes by 
hoodlums all over Nigeria and correspondingly attract more investors. 
 The government should include Peace Studies and Security Management in school 
curriculum at primary, secondary and tertiary levels in Nigeria. This will enable the 
Nigerian youths to appreciate the importance of peace and security in a secular state like 
Nigeria. 
 The use of military action to confront militants appears to be very expensive and most 
often military confrontational approach escalates violence rather than douse tension. 
Principles of mediation, negotiation, arbitration, reconciliation and general amnesty are 
contemporary strategies for contemporary conflict resolution. All militants who accept 
reconciliation should be rehabilitated and reintegrated. 
 Lastly, the government and other interest groups should develop sincere political will to 
implement the recommendations of several panels and committees set-up to investigate 
immediate and remote causes of violent socio-political and ethno-religious crises in Nigeria. 
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